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CONTRACTS - CONSIDERATION- R:sQUIIU3MENT OF CONSIDERATION FOR
MonIFICATION OF A CoNTRAcrr-Landlord leased space to tenant in a building
which was to be erected. The agreement and subsequent modifications pro. vided that the landlord should pay the broker's commission and architect's fees,
and have the power to cancel the lease prior to a specified time. The litigation
arose over another attempted modification in the form of a letter from the
tenant in which the tenant promised to indemnify the landlord for the broker's
commission and architect's fees if the landlord should cancel the lease as it
had the power to do under the agreement. In compliance with the tenant's
request, the landlord signed an acceptance of the letter, which stated that
the letter should constitute a binding agreement. The landlord subsequently
cancelled the lease, but the tenant refused to reimburse the landlord for the
expenses, on the grounds that there was no consideration for the tenant's
promises. On suit by the landlord to enforce the modification, held, a promise
to modify a valid executory contract requires no additional consideration to
be binding. Mid-Century, Ltd., of America v. United Cigar-Whelan Stores
Corp., (D.C. D.C. 1953) 109 F. Supp. 433.
The present case adds to a small but growing minority of decisions which
hold that the consideration for a contract also supports a subsequent promise
to modify that contract.1 The majority of the courts require new consideration,
except in the following areas: executed modifications,2 rescission followed by
the formation of ·a new contract,3 statutory vitiation of the requirement of

1 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., 443-450 (1936). It is concluded in 43 A.L.R.
1451 (1926) and 93 A.L.R. 1404 (1934) that as to leases there is a requirement of
consideration. Later cases to the contrary: Commercial Credit Co. v. Perkins, 236 Ala.
616, 184 S. 178 (1938); Miller v. Stanich, 202 Wis. 539, 544, 230 N.W. 47, 233 N.W.
753 (1930).
,
2 This rule most often is based on a theory of waiver. Cragin v. Eaton, 133 Miss. 151,
97 s. 532 (1923).
3 While some cases have supported the result in the principal case by calling any
modification a rescission followed by a substituted agreement, the requirements of rescission
and substitution which would be universally acceptable to courts following the majority
view would evidently be (1) that the original contract was still partly executory on both
sides, and (2) that both sides had a moment of freedom not to enter into the substitute
agreement. l WILLISTON, CoNTRA.CTs, rev. ed., 447-448 (1936).
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consideration,4 modifications of previously breached contracts,5 or contracts
which themselves provide for subsequent modifications.6 Some cases have
reached the same result as the principal case by expanding the definition of
consideration to include a promise to complete performance despite unforeseen
difficulties,7 or a promise to give up the privilege of breaching the contract
and paying damages.8 Sometimes the agreement has been enforced as a
gift.9 On the facts of the principal case, most courts would hold the additional promise unenforceable, since the promisee did not agree to do more
than his pre-existing duty. The arguments against requiring new consideration are at least twofold. Although it may logically be contended that a
contracting party can never be bound to accept part performance in place of
the whole, or to provide additional consideration in return for the same
performance, there is often a great difference between having the right to
full performance and the likelihood of actually obtaining it For example,
where the financial state of one contracting party is extremely weak, the other
party may be anxious to bargain away more compensation for the same performance. However, it should be noted that such a situation was not shown
in the principal case. A second argument against the need for new consideration in these cases-is based on the fact that one of the major reasons for the
requirement of consideration in any contract is to prove an intent to be
legally bound.10 Where a valid contract is already in existence, however, the
parties in modifying it may be presumed to have this intent. The tenant's
intent is accentuated in the present case by his request for an acceptance
signed by the landlord. On the other hand, strong policy considerations
support the majority view that there must be additional consideration for
modifying a contract. If the requirement of new consideration is abandoned,
there is a danger that the courts will be unable to set aside modifications
obtained by a party in a superior bargaining position who threatens nonperformance simply because of a motive of increasing profit. The problem is
one of detecting and preventing duress, and until a satisfactory touchstone for
4 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §33(2); Mich. Comp. Laws (1948)
§566.1.
5 Of course, an agreement to waive rights after a breach serves as consideration for an
additional promise by the breaching party. Where the same party breaches who obtains
the sole benefit under the modification, however, courts have held the modification enforceable only when executed, on the grounds of waiver. See Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Buffum
& Pendleton, 91 Ore. 352, 179 P. 241 (1919).
6 Kentucky Home Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leitner, 302 Ky. 789, 196 S.W. (2d) 421
(1946).
7 Linz v. Schuck, 106 Md. 220, 67 A. 286 (1907); contra, McGovern v. New York
City, 234 N.Y. 377, 138 N.E. 26 (1923).
SLattimore v. Harson, 14 Johns. (N.Y.) 330 (1817); contra, Kaye v. Hoage, 63 Misc.
332, 117 N.Y.S. 122 (1909). Williston criticizes the logical value of the argument but
ignores the opposing policy consideration of preventing duress. 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRA.crs,
rev. ed., 445 (1936).
9Watkins and Son v. Carrig, (N.H. 1941) 21 A. (2d) 591. This rationale is criticized in 40 Mica. L. Rllv. 748 (1942).
10 Whittier, "The Restatement of Contracts and Consideration," 18 CALIP. L. Rl!v.
611 at 613 (1930).
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this type of duress can be found, the consideration requirement in modification
agreements might better be retained.11

David. Macdonald.

11 Alexander v. S. A. Trufant Commission Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) 34 S.W. 182,
rejected the contention that a threat of breach could constitute duress. Contra, Thomas
v. Brown, 116 Va. 233, 81 S.E. 56 (1914). See Dalzell, "Duress by Economic Pressure
I," 20 N.C. L. RBv. 237 at 255-276 (1942); Dawson, ''Economic Duress-An Essay in
Perspective," 45 M:rCH. L. RBv. 253 (1947); 40 CAI.IF. L. RBv: 425 (1952) (outlining
the requirements of rescinding an executed contract because of economic duress). It would
seem that courts would be more likely to refuse to enforce an executory contract when the
same elements are present.

